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The Invention of Work in Modernity:
Hegel, Marx, and Weber
DANIEL JUST*
Abstract In the modern era, a wide range of human activities has been redefined as
work. This essay traces a genealogy of the modern conception of work, from early
Protestant ethic of work as worship of God, through secularization of this ethic and
the emergence of the idea of progress, to the later model of work as personal duty
and source of stability. Analyzing Hegel, Marx, and Weber’s interpretations of the
growing centrality of work in the modern epoch, as well as later reflections on these
interpretations by Kojève, Arendt, and Foucault, the paper argues that in modernity
work is no longer a mere instrument of power and tool for repressing human life, but
a mode of power of its own accord: a privileged means of shaping life by cultivating
and regulating its productive potential. Modern society is reorganized according to
the principles of productivity, efficiency, and economic welfare of population as a
whole that recalibrate individual existence and posit virtually all activities as a form
of work.
1. Introduction: Modern Work and Its Discontents
Work is the only law of the world. Life has no other purpose, there is no other reason
for existence, we all come into being only to do our share of work and disappear.1
When at the close of the nineteenth century Émile Zola celebrated
work – for his statement, despite its seemingly despondent tone,
was an homage to work, which he believed was a source of stability
in the transience and precariousness of human existence – work
was already an established social and cultural value. Not everyone
accepted this triumph of work. Most notably, Nietzsche condemned
the modern glorification of work, calling it “the true vice of the new
world” that is quickly spreading to Europe, and warning that now
“the never-ceasing talk about the ‘blessing of labor’ holds everyone
in check.”2 According to Nietzsche, leisure became time of recu-
peration and preparation for more work, and thus not an antithesis
of work, but its organic counterpart.3 Also Freud wondered whether
work made people happy and modern life satisfying. But unlike
Nietzsche, Freud was already reconciled with the historical trend.
Conceding to the rising presence of work, he accepted it as an
inevitable outcome of the human proclivity for safety. This procliv-
ity, according to him, originated in primal man who discovered
that “it lay in his own hands, literally, to improve his lot on earth by
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working,” and who consequently chose to exchange “a portion of his
possibilities of happiness for a portion of security.”4 Although for
different reasons and with different ramifications, Zola, Freud, and
to a lesser extent Nietzsche as well, all agreed that if the growing
role of work in modernity involves any notion of happiness, it is a
very paradoxical one: as temporary renunciation of happiness,
modern work becomes a substitute for happiness, and ultimately
its main source.
2. Weber: The Protestant Ethic of Work and
Its Secularization
Max Weber’s magisterial study suggests that the pivotal status of
work in the modern era is a product of the development that started
with the Protestant schism in the early sixteenth century, contin-
ued with the subsequent spread of reformed faiths, and was reified
in an increasingly secularized form during the Industrial Revolu-
tion. According to Weber, it was the Protestant interest in economic
endeavors – especially the Calvinist refocusing of human activities
in the direction of private acquisition and the Baptist (particularly
the Quakers’) emphasis on asceticism as the guiding principle of
economic conduct – that paved the way for the central place of work
in modernity.5
For early Protestants, worship of God through work and active
engagement with daily life was a more devout alternative to monas-
tic spirituality and inactive contemplation. Against the medieval
view of work as unavoidable necessity, and hence something not to
be praised in itself, Protestants introduced work as a virtue and
waste of time as a deadly sin. Time was of vital importance for
Protestants because human life is short and one needs to use it well
in order to succeed in economic pursuits, which are a sign of God’s
blessing and a guarantee of selection for the afterlife. While the
proposition that time is money did not yet apply, it held, as Weber
notes, in a certain spiritual sense: “Loss of time through sociability,
idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health, six
to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation.”6
Weber quotes from the 1673 Puritan tracts and sermons of Richard
Baxter to illustrate this early modern fixation on activity and proper
use of time:
“Keep up a high esteem of time and be every day more careful that you lose none of
your time, than you are that you lose none of your gold and silver. And if vain
recreation, dressings, feastings, idle talk, unprofitable company, or sleep be any of
them temptations to rob you of any of your time, accordingly heighten your
watchfulness”.7
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For Baxter, work protects one from indolence and impropriety –
literally, an “unclean life” – because without serious work and
self-discipline, life lacks grace:
“If God shows you a way in which you may lawfully get more than in another way
(without wrong to your soul or to any other), if you refuse this, and choose the less
gainful way, you cross one of the ends of your calling, and you refuse to be God’s
steward, and to accept His gifts and use them for Him, when He requireth it: you
may labor to be rich for God”.8
Everyone, including the rich, has to work. Moreover, everyone must
create opportunities to work more and with better results. In other
words, one is expected not only to work, but also to enhance one’s
prospects of working with more success. Weber maintains that
this idea of work as God’s calling, a commandment to work for the
divine glory with an ever increasing success, has far-reaching
social and psychological consequences for modernity.9
God’s call to amass riches in His name is a call to work in the spirit
of worldly moderation and self-control in which idleness, spontane-
ity, and enjoyment of life’s sensual riches do not have a place. While
wealth is not a problem if it is part of the performance of duty in a
calling, it becomes one when it turns into temptation to idleness,
enjoyment of life, and accretion of funds for their delayed enjoyment
(having enough one day to be able to live without worries, or trying
to secure such a life for one’s offspring). Fruits of one’s labor are not
to be enjoyed by those who create them or inherit them because
work and its products are a matter of duty. Work, Weber argues, is
an end in itself.10 There is no endpoint and no occasion for a pause
in the process of working and accumulating. Quite the opposite:
one’s investment of time and effort into work grows in proportion to
one’s economic success. The greater one’s possessions, as Weber
points out, the more intense the feeling of responsibility for them,
“for holding them undiminished for the glory of God and increasing
them by restless effort.”11 One’s commitment must be to work and to
multiply one’s fortunes, that is, neither to enjoy them nor to invest
them into fixed possessions – such as property and land, in the
manner of aristocratic class – but to reinvest them into enterprises
that will lead to further riches. This early Protestant emphasis on
work and renunciation of enjoyment provides a basis for the modern
division of labor as a way to augment profit-making activities.
Moreover, it fosters the psychological disposition of the modern
individual: that “sober, middle-class, self-made man,” as Weber
describes him, with “formalistic, hard, correct character.”12
Interestingly enough, the rise of wealth and the strengthening of
the middle class that took place in the late eighteenth century did
not significantly alter the early Protestant ethic of work analyzed by
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Weber. Although this new development was accompanied by secu-
larization and new comforts unknown to Puritans, the bourgeois
emphasis on work implied the same notion of enjoyment – one
which is curbed, reserved, and postponed. The main concern
remained to multiply wealth in the economically unpredictable
environment in which it could quickly diminish, and which there-
fore demanded disciplined work coupled with parsimony. What was
at stake was not just economic wellbeing. As for early Puritans,
work was more than a pragmatic venture. It was a social and
cultural value. Although things changed with heavy industrializa-
tion in the nineteenth century, as the bourgeoisie became a more
powerful and prevalent class than before and entrepreneurship
turned to bolder and larger scale speculation, even this new com-
mercial imagination, while indeed oriented more towards the future
and motivated less by the older accent on caution and earnestness,
was nevertheless still driven by the same principles of calculation,
utility, and efficiency. As Barrington Moore showed, in the nine-
teenth century working regularly and scrupulously was still the
keystone of a lifestyle that was deemed moral, and thus good,
because it was rational and methodical.13 Jürgen Kocka confirms
that the values of achievement and profit – as well as those that
fostered them, such as industriousness, rationality, and emotional
control – persisted well into the late nineteenth century, a fact
illustrated by Franco Moretti’s statistical analysis of nineteenth-
century novels in which the most frequent words associated with
bourgeoisie in these texts were “useful,” “efficiency,” “serious,” and
“earnest.”14 According to Moretti, these qualities continued to
define life both within and beyond the realm of business activities.
Seriousness, for example, as an extension and a kind of sublima-
tion of commercial honesty, was a way of coming to terms with
reality that was no longer seen as a necessity, but a value. Moretti
insists that for a nineteenth-century bourgeois “containing one’s
immediate desires is not just repression: it is culture.”15
Starting in the late eighteenth century and continuing through-
out the following one, serious work, efficient accumulation of
wealth, and earnest enlargement of one’s possessions was still, as
it was for early Protestants, what one was expected to do. In this
framework of modern life governed by work, enjoyment was infi-
nitely delayed because steady accumulation, and thus meaningful
life, could be assured only through patient work and reinvestment
of wealth. As Karl Löwith remarked with respect to the man of the
bourgeois epoch, but the statement could have been as easily made
by Weber with respect to early Protestants, modern man not only
works, but desires to work, because life without work “would seem
to him not worth living, lived ‘in vain’.”16
Daniel Just
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 30 No. 2 June 2017
438
The chief notion that emerges with the gradual process of secu-
larization of the Protestant ethic of work is the idea of progress. The
notion of progress that is larger than the lifetime of a single indi-
vidual extends the Protestant emphasis on work and renunciation
of pleasure by attaching work to an investment into the next
generation, rather than to personal salvation. The concept of divin-
ity does not disappear, but it does change as a result of increasing
secularization and mechanization. As Peter Sloterdijk argued, in
the era of mechanization the concept of divinity turns from the
biological conception of procreation to that of production, with “the
procreating God becoming increasingly a world manufacturer,
the original producer.”17 The modern ideas of progress and produc-
tion are both a continuation of the Protestant work ethic and a
response to it. They are an adaptation of this ethic to the newly
arisen need to make oneself at home in the world that no longer has
the guarantee of the divine order. As a vehicle of progress, it is work
that gives the unhinged life and history an appearance of predict-
ability. In a gesture of “self-assertion,” as Hans Blumenberg called
it, by which the modern man assumes a place in history and posits
himself within the course of historical development – a gesture
unimaginable in premodern times when progress and man’s place
in it were thinkable only as a result of divine intervention – work
becomes a way of actively mastering the new world.18 It is still
salvation through work, including suspended enjoyment and allot-
ment of time into what makes work more productive, that serves as
the guideline for action. But now it is no longer because of one’s
salvation in the afterlife. Salvation now takes place in this world,
through what people leave behind as a result of their work and their
belief that progress continues after their death, and it will be only
later – according to Charles Taylor only much later, in the second
half of the twentieth century – when the modern idea of disciplined
work as the underpinning of progress disintegrates and when
further secularization preserves the work ethic, but not the frugal
approach to consumption anymore.19
When Weber examines the shift from the early Protestant search
for the kingdom of God through work to the later modern worldli-
ness that no longer needs the support of religion, he confirms
that the renunciation of enjoyment in later stages of modernity
coexists with the principles of self-assertion and investment into
individual salvation by way of subsequent generations. He argues
that for modern workers, those “sober, conscientious, and unusu-
ally industrious workmen” shaped by religious asceticism, work as
a calling in the spirit of capitalism is the same as the earlier Puritan
work ethic – “only without the religious basis.”20 This emphasis on
continuity (of work and renunciation of enjoyment) in spite of
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change (from personal salvation to salvation through accumulation
from generation to generation) reveals an important, even if under-
stated, undercurrent in Weber’s analysis of modern work. One of
the texts central to Weber’s argument is the following passage by
John Wesley:
“I fear, wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the
same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things,
for any revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily
produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as
riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches. [. . .]
So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is
there no way to prevent this – this continual decay of pure religion? We ought not to
prevent people from being diligent and frugal; we must exhort all Christians to gain
all they can, and to save all they can; that is, in effect, to grow rich”.21
Weber reproduces this passage in its entirety, italicizing the last
sentence so as to draw attention to the fact that the secular version
of the Protestant ethic of work not only does not betray the Puritan
model of work, but that it is inherent in this model. Nevertheless,
Weber curiously omits two concluding sentences from Wesley’s text.
Where Weber terminates the quote, Wesley continues: “There is one
way, and only one, under heaven. If those who gain all they can,
and save all they can, will likewise give all they can; then, the more
they gain, the more they will grow in grace.”22 One can speculate
why Weber left out these two sentences, but the most obvious
explanation, namely that they did not fit his argument about the
Protestant appeal to an uncompromising accumulation, is not the
only, or even the most plausible, reason. For Weber, Wesley’s insis-
tence on giving, although opposed to accumulation for its own sake,
is rendered ineffective and unrealizable precisely by the Protestant
ethic of work. If growing in grace depends on increased gains, giving
away these gains must be, similarly to enjoyment, postponed. Since
one’s duty in venerating God is to reinvest work’s gains according
to one’s best economic conscience, one needs to follow, first and
foremost, one’s obligation to invest work into a better organization
of work and more efficient ways of multiplying profits. Even for
Wesley, working takes precedence over giving.
The undercurrent that drives Weber’s analysis of work is the
following question: What is the impulse that sustains the continu-
ity of the early modern notion of work throughout modernity in
spite of the sweeping historical changes that come with seculariza-
tion and industrialization? Weber suggests that this impulse is the
effort of the modern individual to overcome the sense of isolation,
emptiness, and meaninglessness of the present moment, which
is one of the most distinct experiences of the modern era. The
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guarantee that work will have this redeeming function of filling the
present with meaning by connecting it to what lies beyond it is, in
the case of early Protestants, God and afterlife, and, in the case of
secular bourgeoisie, progeny that links one’s lifetime to that of the
next generation. But Weber does not take a closer look at this
impulse. It is Hegel and Marx who do so. Hegel and Marx propose
that in the era of no divine assurances, work links the present to
the past and the future because it becomes the axis of a new way
of shaping the productive potential of human life and the collective
welfare of the population as a whole.
3. Hegel and Marx: Work and the Shift in Forms of Power
Hegel posits work as the foundation of human culture and its
historical evolution. As purposeful shaping by tools, work is a
means to attain ends, a “middle term” between humanity and the
world.23 Unlike the animal, which does not work and which satisfies
its needs directly from nature – animal desire is pure negation of
objects that are therefore evanescent and lacking in objectivity –
man’s act of taking nature as the object of work is “desire restrained
and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed.”24 For Hegel,
this delayed desire that transforms nature into human products is
essential to the founding of human consciousness. Man has con-
sciousness, something that is unknown to animals, because work
puts him in relation to his products. As man-producer realizes
that it is he who is the source of the product’s independence as an
object, he becomes conscious of his independence as a subject. As
the starting point of human consciousness, work is the origin of
culture and its subsequent historical development. In Hegel’s sce-
nario, the dialectic of work, individual consciousness, and collective
human culture starts at the moment of violent imposition of work
by the master, who does not work, on the bondsman who works for
him. But as Hegel stresses, it is paradoxically the bondsman, not
the master, who is the real master of nature. The bondsman is the
one who shapes nature by imprinting concrete forms on it in the act
of working, thereby creating the human world.25 According to Hegel,
the modern era begins at the moment when the working bondsman
becomes conscious of his position in history as the maker of human
society and culture.
Marx’s analysis of the role of work in the self-conception of the
modern individual follows a similar line of reasoning as Hegel’s.
Marx, too, believes that people begin to distinguish themselves
from animals as soon as they “begin to produce their means of
subsistence.”26 But Marx objects to what he perceives as Hegel’s
“abstractly mental” approach to work.27 According to Marx, Hegel
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reduces work to a spiritual force when he argues that man as spirit
(consciousness of objectivized being in its historical becoming) acts
through work on nature (that which is opposed to spirit and which
sets history in motion by resisting it). Marx insists that in order to
explain the role of work in modernity, work must be regarded as
concrete rapport with material reality, rather than as an agent of
spirit’s engagement with its environment. The crux of Marx’s argu-
ment is his proposition that the modern era relegates concrete work
to an aspect of produced value. By making workers sell their work
for wages – the amount of which is established by the market that
retains a share of the value created by workers – modern capital
transforms work into a commodity, an abstract form of “labor
power” (Arbeitskraft).28 In modern capitalism, labor power, as
one’s general ability to work, becomes “abstract labor,” a value-
transforming activity involved in the manufacturing of products
that adds monetary value to things.29 Abstract labor is the effect
of modern capitalist speculation on work that emphasizes the
exchange value of products. As employers speculate how to make
profit, they consider not only whether hiring workers for their new
venture will accomplish the work this venture will require, but also
whether the labor of these workers will add value to the created
product and in so doing lead to profit. According to Marx, modern
work can no longer be defined by a split into work that is necessary
and work that is a surplus. All work is now predicated on the
principle of surplus and exposed to increasingly abstract forces.
In both Hegel and Marx’s accounts, abstractness and abstraction
are the recurring attributes of modern work. As many critics have
pointed out – Michel Foucault, for example – the issue at stake
when it comes to modern work is not only abstractness of the
actual coordinates of work as it manifests itself in the real world.
It is not only that in modernity work has become more abstract;
the question is also abstraction with respect to the way in which
modern work is described and interpreted. Interestingly, the
problem of abstraction concerns not only Hegel, but also Marx.
Although reproaching Hegel for his abstract approach to work,
Marx, according to Foucault, is equally abstract when he discusses
modern work as labor power. Instead of concrete work, Marx’s
conception of work as labor power addresses work that “has been
cut off from its human reality, from all its qualitative variables.”30 In
a move that resembles Marx’s reproach of Hegel, Foucault suggests
that the perspective of concrete human reality is vital to capturing
the role of work in modernity and man’s place in it, because work
“is absolutely not man’s concrete essence or man’s existence in
its concrete form.”31 For Foucault, modern man is not a worker.
He is made into one via an operation that ties him to work and
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that makes him part of the production apparatus within which
he works. Although intended as a critique of Marx, Foucault’s
approach to modern work as a form of power is important because
it helps to draw out from Marx’s and Hegel’s analyses of the place
of work in modernity what might not be immediately apparent in
them.
According to Foucault, the most significant operation that trans-
forms people into modern workers is control over their time. Unlike
feudal society that controlled individuals on the basis of space,
modern society cares about their spatial ties only to the extent of
claiming their time. Foucault argues that, beginning in the late
eighteenth century when the newly introduced politics of health
turned poverty into an unacceptable form of idleness that had to be
eliminated, modernity adapts people to the needs of modern pro-
duction by molding their time into labor time.32 Modern society
mobilizes all of people’s available time to the extent that it is no
longer just the time of the work day, but the whole lifespan that is
now the object of the best possible utilization by the production
apparatus.33 Foucault illustrates how institutions whose professed
function it was to provide protection and security in fact served as
a means of ensuring that entire population and the whole time
of human existence were inscribed into the labor market. For
example, amid the wage raises in France and England in 1840s and
1850s, the surplus of money was deposited into workers’ savings
funds, not in order to improve workers’ comfort, let alone serve as
a buffer to stage strikes, but for future use in case of job loss. This
strategy was part of larger forces that redefined modern society
along the lines of efficiency and productivity. This strategy bol-
stered efficiency and strengthened the market’s flexibility, as
employers needed to hire and dispose of workers freely, without
nonetheless letting them die of hunger before they were needed
again or elsewhere.34
Foucault’s insistence on analyzing modern work in concrete
forms, as an outcome of forces that regulate work by activating
workers and inciting their increased engagement in the act of
working, is rooted in his conviction that the uniquely modern type
of power is essentially linked to economic concerns. In modernity,
power no longer represses life; it supports life and promotes it by
cultivating its productive potential. Work becomes a form of invest-
ment of the specifically modern type of power in human capital.
Differentiating between an early stage of modernity (end of the
seventeenth century and the beginning of the next) and its later
stage (the second half of the eighteenth century and the following
one), Foucault argues that whereas in the earlier stage people were
turned into workers by means of disciplinary technologies (e.g.,
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spatial distribution of individual bodies, surveillance of these
bodies, and drills and exercises that disciplined them), in the
second stage new regulatory mechanisms emerged that at first
supplemented the older disciplinary mechanisms and later largely
replaced them.35 Although serving the same purpose of turning
people into workers, the new form of power did so, not by disci-
plining and repressing life, but by nourishing its economic poten-
tial. This positive kind of power – positive in terms of producing and
productive, not unproblematic – is crucial to modernity because the
latter, Foucault claims, “would not have been possible without the
controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production
and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic
processes.”36
The main difference between the older repressive power and the
new “biopower” when it comes to work is that while the former was
concerned with the immediate value of individual body for work,
the latter focuses on regulating entire population according to the
value of economic productivity. Modern biopower takes for its
object not the actual work of individual workers, but the potential
of population as such to work. Various mechanisms were mobilized
to stimulate this potential, such as statistical data (birth rates,
mortality rates, and longevity predictions), safety policies, charities
for the old and incapacitated, and health care schemes that empha-
sized therapeutic rather than normalizing procedures.37 The many
means of promoting work and productivity directly – above all, the
advancement of education and introduction of student loans to
enable people to acquire needed work qualifications – were supple-
mented by other measures that pertained to work less directly, but
that were nevertheless part of the same power operation of fash-
ioning people as workers and shaping human life through work.
Mechanisms, such as hygienic rules, were devised to secure the
optimal age of population; pension funds, saving funds, and other
incentives to save were created so as to foster a workforce that was
more flexible; and tax deductions, maternity leaves, and the estab-
lishment of day care were intended to encourage reproduction and
make workers more readily available.38 All these new mechanisms
that composed modern biopower contributed to a single goal: an
economically more efficient and productive society.
Foucault’s examination of work as a form of power offers an
innovative perspective on modern work. But while critical of Marx,
this perspective is not as adverse to Marx as Foucault presents it.
Marx surely would not be opposed to analyzing work by looking at
operations that bind people to the apparatus of production. But
what is even more intriguing is that Foucault presents the effects of
these operations by returning to Marx’s formulations. He argues,
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for instance, that the operation that inaugurated modern industrial
society consisted of two acts: “First, individuals’ time must be put
on the market, offered to those wishing to buy it, and buy it in
exchange for a wage; and, second, their time must be transformed
into labor time.”39 Curiously, the reproach that Marx transforms
concrete work into abstract labor power is absent. When Foucault
suggests that “the function of transforming the body into labor
power corresponds to the function of transforming time into labor
time,” he is essentially paraphrasing Marx.40 While indeed putting
more emphasis than Marx on how workers responded to these
trends and how they became personally invested in mechanisms of
allocating their time, Foucault nonetheless admits that the turning
of work into abstract labor power is not a result of Marx’s perspec-
tive on the place of work in modernity, but the effect of actual forces
in modern society. In both accounts, as well as in Hegel’s, abstract-
ness emerges as an inescapable trait of modernity itself.
When compared to the ancien régime of the Middle Ages,
abstractness stands out as the most distinctive feature of the
modern era. Aaron Gurevich and Jacques Le Goff maintain that the
idea of abstract time, which served as a catalyst for other forms of
abstractness in modernity, would have been inconceivable in the
ancien régime.41 By the end of the eighteenth century, abstractness
permeated all strata of modern society, becoming part of both the
macro-level of economy and the state, and the micro-level of every-
day life of individuals and families. Rules of precision, numbers,
and abstract measurements that were first introduced in the
sphere of economy were adopted as practical tools to make daily life
more orderly. Teaching households important lessons, such as
keeping a track of finances, these rules became a routine that took
over non-financial matters as well, such as keeping a track of
events in everyday life (e.g., records of inoculations, sent letters,
and received and given presents) in “a kind of profit and loss ledger
of family and social life,” as Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall
put it.42 This turn to abstractness, its implementation in everyday
life, as well as the more general shift in the apprehension of time
described by E. P. Thompson, had an enormous impact on work
and work discipline.43 These changes were instrumental in radically
transforming the perception of the human body. By the end of
the nineteenth century, the human body became a focal point of
such a level of abstractness that workers were now regarded as
human machines. As Anson Rabinbach showed, the budding dis-
cipline of “ergonomy,” which propounded a quantitative model of
the economy of energy that subordinated all social activities of
these human machines to the objective of maximizing output,
advocated various modifications in the work routine, as well as in
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leisure activities and even workers’ diet, in order to ensure more
efficient production.44 The influence of this fantasy of reciprocity
between bodies and machines posited by the new “science” of
ergonomy went well beyond the realm of the economics of work. As
Mark Seltzer demonstrated, this fantasy entered a popular aware-
ness after featuring prominently in late nineteenth-century litera-
ture.45 What all these studies – from Gurevich and Le Goff, through
Thompson, to Rabinbach and Seltzer – reveal is that abstractness
is not a mere by-product of, let alone a distortion perpetuated by,
critical approaches to modern work. Abstractness is a tangible
material force and a major attribute of modernity that significantly
impacted on work.
4. Critical Strategies of Inquiry into the Role of
Work in Modernity
Hegel, Marx, and Weber’s main contribution to the issue of turning
people into modern workers is their revelation of how work operates
as a social value and organizing principle of modern “material life”
– that infra-economy of goods and practices, as Fernand Braudel
understood it, that gives concrete form to people’s everyday exis-
tence.46 The key questions for Hegel, Marx, and Weber are the
following: How do modern individuals become endowed with their
social roles and transformed into workers? How these changes that
take place in real life are presented, interpreted, and understood,
both at the collective and personal level? The emphasis in these
questions is less on challenging specific aspects of modern work
(such as treatment of workers, levels of salaries, and quality of
working conditions) – although these certainly remain relevant,
particularly for Marx – than on bringing to light contradictions
generated by the place of work in modern society. The most impor-
tant of these contradictions, and the principal observation made by
Hegel, Marx, and Weber with respect to modern work, is that the
latter functions as both the cause and the cure for alienation.
Hegel, Marx, and Weber suggest that the modern process of uproot-
ing traditional guarantees, which in the ancien régime gave life
meaning that redeemed the isolation of the present moment by
linking it to something beyond it, delegates the new role of this
guarantee of meaning to work; at the same time, however, work is
the reason why this new guarantee is needed in the first place.
As Hegel notes, the modern era of machines neither reduces work
nor de-alienates the act of working. In fact, the opposite is true,
because “the more mechanical work becomes, the less value it has,
and the more the individual must work.”47 Similarly to Weber’s
argument that early Protestants had to work regardless of whether
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they were rich or poor, Hegel insists that everyone – workers as well
as the bourgeoisie – is subject to this increase. For Hegel, this
cannot be otherwise because even though the modern state is no
longer based on the master-bondsman opposition, it is not yet a
state in which work is done for the community and not capital.
Envisioning a state in which people are reconciled with everything,
Hegel postulates this state as the objective manifestation of the
subjective condition that he calls “wise man.” In Alexandre Kojève’s
account, wise man is someone who is “fully and perfectly self-
conscious,” “the man who wants nothing, who desires nothing,”
who “wants to change nothing, either in himself or outside of
himself [and who] therefore does not act.”48 In other words, wise
man no longer works. With him, work as an instrument of the fight
against nature comes to a halt. As work ceases to define human
activities, it ceases to define people. The act of working is still
carried out for the sake of the survival of community, but society is
no longer structured around work. Kojève likens the sort of work
that takes place at the moment when work stops defining society to
the way animals take care of their necessities. At this point, he
argues, people “construct their edifices and works of art as birds
build their nests and spiders spin their webs.”49
Kojève’s metaphor of animal fabrication that marks the end of
work as the central organizing principle of modern society resur-
faces in Hannah Arendt’s reading of Marx. According to Arendt,
Marx imagines that at this moment all human activities derive “as
naturally from human ‘nature’ as the secretion of wax by bees for
making the honeycomb; to live and to labor for life will have become
one and the same, and life will no longer ‘begin for him [the laborer]
where this activity [of laboring] ceases’.”50 In both Kojève’s and
Arendt’s portrayals, the end of work means the end of modernity,
which in turn means that life and work merge together, with people
looking after themselves in the manner of birds, bees, and spiders.
However, there is one important difference between the two inter-
pretations (leaving aside the obvious fact that Kojève’s reading of
Hegel is an exposé, even if a very idiosyncratic one, while Arendt’s
take on Marx is a critique). The crucial difference is that whereas
Kojève argues that life takes over work by pushing it to the
minimum – he insists that people at this point “work as little as
possible”51 – Arendt suggests that life and work at this point in
history simply coincide. For Arendt, work becomes a natural act.
Arendt’s reading is problematic, among other reasons, because in
the passage in the first volume of Capital, in which Marx discusses
the work of bees and distinguishes it from the work of an architect
who first builds cells in his mind and only then actualizes in reality
what he first conceived as a mental project, this distinction is
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immediately overturned, as Moishe Postone notes, with the argu-
ment that in modernity any aspect of work that appears to be
exclusively human, such as purposiveness, is an attribute of
capital.52
Unlike Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s idea of the end of work,
Arendt’s reading of the same idea in Marx emphasizes a qualitative
shift in the direction of work’s de-alienation, but no quantitative
adjustments. Beside the passage from Capital, Arendt’s conclusion
is based on the following section from Marx’s “Wage, Labor and
Capital”:
The worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks
stones, carries loads, etc. – does he consider this twelve hours’ weaving, spinning,
drilling, turning, building, shoveling, stone breaking as a manifestation of his life, as
life? On the contrary, life begins for him where this activity ceases.53
Identifying alienated work as the cause of the corrosion of worker’s
life, Arendt confines Marx’s analysis of modern work to a political
plea for work’s de-alienation. She presents Marx’s argument as a
call to surmount the separation between work and life, and reach
a production that would be animal-like and natural.
It is true that Marx’s early works were driven by the vision of
natural production and incitement of social change that would
precipitate it. But the purpose for introducing the notion of
work’s end in his later texts is less to picture the event of work’s
de-alienation, than to describe the specificity of modern society.
Marx’s theorization of de-alienation and the notion of the end of
work are critical tools designed to bring to the fore the way work
operates as a value which determines modern life and shapes it into
its current form. When Marx argues that for modern workers life
begins when their twelve-hour shift ends, the issue he raises is
irreducible to political call for an improvement of their working
conditions. As we saw with Weber and Hegel, also for Marx the
problem is not only alienated work. As the third volume of Capital
makes it clear, work as such is a problem. Replacing the term “life,”
which in “Wage, Labor and Capital” is opposed to alienated pro-
duction, with the term “realm of freedom,” Marx posits the latter
against material production in general. He argues that the realm of
freedom begins where work “determined by necessity and mundane
considerations ceases.”54 Admittedly, the third volume of Capital
neither defines freedom nor explicitly discusses the meaning of the
term “realm of freedom.” As Jan Kandiyali has recently pointed out,
the result of this conceptual vagueness is the fact that the notion of
the realm of freedom, in spite of being opposed to the notion of the
realm of necessity, does not rule out a possibility of varying degrees
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of freedom within the realm of necessity, because each realm
entails a different type of freedom: whereas freedom in the realm of
necessity designates collective ability of people within a specific
mode of production to control their economic activity, rather than
being ruled by external forces, the realm of freedom signifies self-
realization and development of one’s distinctly human potentialities
outside the realm of necessity and economic activity.55 In other
words, even for late Marx there are modes of production in which
work is less alienated and less adverse to freedom than in others.
However, it needs to be underscored that while Marx’s argument
allows for a possibility of work’s de-alienation that would make
humankind reach a certain level of freedom even while working,
this type of freedom pertains only to a freer way of satisfying
physical needs. Unlike Marx’s earlier texts, in which human beings
and their freedom is presented as inextricable from work, and in
which, consequently, the main question is political change and
induction of a different mode of production wherein work would
become meaningful, in the third volume of Capital real freedom lies
outside the realm of necessity and economic activity – that is,
outside of work.
Similarly to Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel and his argument
about working as little as possible, in the third volume of Capital
Marx insists that for the realm of freedom to flourish “the reduction
of the working day is the basic prerequisite.”56 There have been
numerous proposals to reduce the number of working hours, both
in Marx’s time and thereafter. For example, in 1883 Paul Lafargue
provocatively called for a law that would forbid people to work more
than three hours a day.57 This call was later reiterated by Raoul
Vaneigem, who argued that three hours of work per day would be
enough to sustain society with the technology available in 1938,
and echoed by both Henri Lefebvre, who justified it by the increas-
ing broadening and diversification of modern productive forces, and
Guy Debord, who demanded that modern technology be used to
untie people from work, rather than to increase their standard of
living.58 But beyond serving as an inspiration for different political
appeals for change, Marx’s late notion of work’s reduction should
be seen – similarly to Hegel’s idea of the end of work – as an
instrument of critical analysis in his inquiry into the nature of
modernity.
Hegel’s and Marx’s concepts of the realm of freedom, reduction of
work, and the end of work are critical strategies of exposing the
dominance of work in the modern era, because these concepts draw
attention to the resistance of modern society to any questioning of
work and its status. As Garry Cross argued, the nineteenth-century
liberal state was particularly hostile to this questioning and to any
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calls to reduce working hours, as long hours and low wages were
deemed necessary for higher output and growth.59 Shorter hours
were feared to raise unit costs, disrupt scheduling, and limit flex-
ibility in responding to orders, which, together with raises in wages
as a result of intensifying competition, would jeopardize profit.
Cross surmises that, if pressed, nineteenth-century employers
were more likely to raise wages than shorten the workday because
the former concession was more permissible to a possible later
reversal.60 This competitive pressure to extend the workday,
instead of shortening it, was further fueled by the expanding
modernization, as expensive machinery had to be utilized to the
maximum, which other inventions, such as gas lamps, now made
possible by eliminating natural limits on the workday.61 Within this
social, political, and economic context, the notions of de-alienation
of work, reduction of working hours, and the end of work were less
prognostic statements and more diagnostic attempts to draw out
and make more apparent the growing centrality of work in modern
society.
5. Conclusion: Work as an Invention of Modernity
What is the purpose of these unheard-of constructions [factories, bridges, railways,
canals, telegraph lines, furnaces]? In large part, they directly serve production. In part,
they serve transport and trade, and thus indirectly production. In part, they serve
administration, domicile and health care, and thus predominantly production. In part,
they serve science, art, technology, education, recreation, and thus indirectly once
again production.62
Making resources an object of explicit calculations and mecha-
nisms of human life an issue of production, productivity, and
efficiency, modern society radically changes ways in which power
has hitherto operated. Modern power no longer deals with legal
subjects over whom coercion is exercised with the ultimate author-
ity of death. As Foucault demonstrated, modern power deals with
living beings, their productivity, and their usefulness to the eco-
nomic welfare of the population as a whole.63 In modernity, the lives
of everyone, not just those concerned with financial gain, are
determined by work and economic valuation. Weber laments that
while “the Puritan wanted to work in a calling, we are forced to do
so.”64
André Gorz is right when he declares that “what we call ‘work’ is
an invention of modernity.”65 But he is wrong to explain this inven-
tion by arguing that whereas in the ancien régime work was “a way
of life,” in modern times it is “just a means of earning a living.”66 In
modernity, work is above all a way of life. The modern era is shaped
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by work and governed by values and practices anchored in it. Work
is a privileged conduit of the specifically modern form power that
includes various disciplining institutions and normative mecha-
nisms (factory, working hours, wages, and policies of the liberal
state); regulative knowledge linked to these institutions (discourses
of economics, ergonomics, and economy of energy); as well as the
corresponding social and cultural values (prosperity, efficiency,
achievement, seriousness, industriousness, and rationality) that
are diffused and either internalized or resisted. If we do not limit
modernity to an evolutionary stage that all societies are destined to
reach at some point, but instead understand it, as Postone sug-
gests, as “a specific form of social life that originated in western
Europe and has developed into a complex global system,” then,
Hegel, Marx, and Weber’s analyses of work appear less as a denun-
ciation of particular forms of exploitation within the modern
society, and more as a critique of the nature of modernity itself.67
Although work in their texts does not always function as a steady
concept, and although the family resemblance of these thinkers as
theorists of modernity is loose as well, what their analyses of
modern work share is the general framework of interpretation.
Hegel, Marx, and Weber do not condemn work’s alienation and
criticize work’s private factors from the point of view of its social
factors. With the exception of the early Marx, they do not posit some
authentic model of work that modernity distorts. Theirs is not a
critique of modern society from the standpoint of work, but, as
Postone remarks in reference to Marx, an assessment of the socially
constitutive role played by work in that society – a society in which
work itself is a vehicle of social domination.68
The paradox of modernity is that the practice of spiritualizing
work and endowing it with redemptive powers, although driven by
the ideal of the present moment that is full, complete, and mean-
ingful on its own, generates a time that is increasingly more accel-
erating and always ahead of itself. In modernity, the present
escapes more than ever before. As one works for the future in an
ever more frantic tempo, one pushes the present moment progres-
sively further out of reach. Rather than security, as Freud still
believed, modern work engenders a state of permanent insecurity.
Reminiscent of Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument about the logic
of the Enlightenment – which, although set to oppose irrationality,
comes to an ironic denouement in the irrational extremes to
which it leads (e.g., totalitarianism, Nazism, culture industry, and
destruction of nature) – modern work expedites, instead of attenu-
ating, the loss of traditional guarantees that secured life in the
premodern era. Hegel, Marx, and Weber suggest that the main
concern regarding modern work is not that it is prescribed as a
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remedy that fails to cure alienation. The main concern is that
modernity radically reorganizes society according to the principles
of efficiency, productivity, and economic welfare of population, and
that by recalibrating individual existence according to these same
principles, it effectively redefines all human activities as a form of
work. In modernity, people no longer work only when performing
the act of working. They invest their time as work, produce them-
selves by working, and relate to their life and the world through
work.
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